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Abstract
We use the history of private limited liability companies (PLLCs) to challenge two pervasive
assumptions in the literature: (1) Anglo-American legal institutions were better for economic
development than continental Europe’s civil-law institutions; and (2) the corporation was the superior
form of business organization. Data on the number and types of firms organized in France, Germany,
the UK, and the US show that that the PLLC became the form of choice for small- and medium-size
enterprises wherever and whenever it was introduced. The PLLC’s key advantage was its flexible
internal governance rules that allowed its users to limit the threat of untimely dissolution inherent in
partnerships without taking on the full danger of minority oppression that the corporation entailed. The
PLLC was first successfully introduced in Germany, a code country, in 1892. Great Britain, a
common-law country followed in 1907, and France, a code country, in 1925. The laggard was the US,
a common-law country whose courts had effectively killed earlier attempts to enact the form.
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Introduction
The links between the history of capitalism and the rise of the corporation are
deep. Whether the focus is on financial or industrial capitalism, the story most often
features large-scale enterprises as critical agents of economic transformation. Such
enterprises could not have existed without a legal framework that allowed owners to lock
in capital and delegate managerial responsibility while at the same time limiting the risks
that investors bore. Hence the capitalist transition in turn depended on a legal
transformation that is typically reduced to a narrative of the rise of the corporation. This
view of history has been so pervasive and influential that the corporation in its ideal form
(low cost of formation, concentrated management chosen by an elected board of
directors, limited liability, and freely traded equity) has generally been assumed to be the
superior form of business organization. Moreover, because corporations that
approximated the ideal flourished in the US and the UK, this view of history has
confirmed a second widely held assumption: that Anglo-American legal institutions
afforded businesses support and protection superior to that offered by countries on the
European continent. To a large extent both of these assumptions were products of the
“American century,” when the US economy was both dominant and dominated by
corporations.
Based on a broader survey of historical experience we take issue with such a
simplification of the relationship between business law and economic change. Although
multi-owner firms have grown in number and size since the early nineteenth century, they
have been plagued with governance problems, and the corporation has not been a
panacea. As a result, even in the US, most business associations continued to organize as
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partnerships for at least a century after the spread of general incorporation laws. During
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries European governments created an
alternative business form—what we call the private limited liability company (PLLC).
Whenever a variant of this form became available—in Germany in 1892, Britain in 1907,
and France in 1925—it quickly swamped the corporation in popularity. For all practical
purposes, US firms did not have a similar option until the second half of the twentieth
century. 1
Although their specific features vary across countries, PLLCs are all joint stock,
limited liability enterprises. They cannot raise capital from the public and their securities
cannot be traded in organized markets, but in compensation for these restrictions they
benefit from low fees and minimal disclosure requirements. Limited liability might seem
to be a sufficient advantage to explain why PLLCs were preferred to partnerships, and
low fees and low disclosure requirements might well explain their popularity relative to
corporations. We argue, however, that these common characteristics, while important,
cannot in and of themselves account for the form’s rapid spread. Instead, the PLLC’s
success owed to its capacity to expand the range of governance options. As we show, the
PLLC’s precise impact (whether it mainly displaced corporations or partnerships)
depended on the specific legal context in which it was introduced. Thus the legal and
legislative history of other forms of business association is also quite important for
explaining the PLLC’s popularity.
To develop this argument, we offer an alternative understanding of the
determinants of organizational choice that conceives of business people as trading off one
1

As we will describe below, the states of Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio enacted enabling
legislation for a type of PLLC in the 1870s and early 1880s, but adverse court decisions limited the form’s
appeal and it did not spread to other states.
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kind of contracting problem against another. 2 Although the corporate form solves the
main disadvantage of partnerships—that they can be dissolved too easily—its
hierarchical structure allows managers to steer returns toward themselves at the expense
of stockholders. Business people who wish to avoid the cost of managerial knavery must
either modify the standard articles of incorporation in ways so substantial as to give up
key features of the corporate form or choose another form of organization. In the case of
large-scale enterprises, most owners want their investments to be tradable and hence
organize corporations. But most small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) have few
owners and their equity does not trade; hence their organizers may be less willing to incur
the corporation’s disadvantages. During the nineteenth century the only way that owners
of SMEs in the US and Britain could avoid these drawbacks was by bearing the costs of
partnerships. In France and Germany the availability of a third alternative, the limited
partnership, enabled business people to moderate the terms of the tradeoff to some extent.
The advantage of PLLCs was that they gave entrepreneurs much greater flexibility to mix
and match the attributes of partnerships and corporations.
This article is part of a larger effort in which we are engaged to move beyond
publicly traded corporations and study the impact of the legal environment on privately
held companies. Although the law and finance literature has focused on the former, the
legal environment is likely to matter more for SMEs, on whom the fixed costs of
complying with the legal requirements of the corporate form are likely to weigh more
heavily. In this article we argue that the PLLC had important benefits for SMEs and trace
its emergence and diffusion in Germany, Britain, France, and the US over the past two
2

This paper focuses on the organizational choices made by members of multi-owner firms. Hence we set
aside questions related to the legal rules governing single-owner enterprises and also decisions that affect
whether or not an enterprise has multiple owners.
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centuries. We first lay out the rationale for our focus on the PLLC and then explore
alternative hypotheses to account for differences across the four countries in the
popularity of the form. We pursue this agenda by compiling a record of the
organizational choices available in each country and how these options changed over
time, by gathering preliminary estimates for each country of the take-up rate of PLLCs,
and by assessing the impact of the PLLC on the use of alterative organizational forms.
Finally, we show that business people did indeed exploit the flexibility of the form by
presenting examples of actual PLLC contracts from each country.
We have chosen our four countries because they were all economically successful
and all key legal innovators. The French and German civil and commercial codes formed
the basis of business law in many countries in Asia and South America, as well as
elsewhere in Europe; the UK is widely recognized as the birthplace of the common law;
and the US, another important common-law country, is credited with democratizing the
corporation. Following these four countries over the last two centuries presents a number
of challenges because differences in their legal systems and the political process of
legislative change make collecting comparable evidence difficult and sometimes
impossible. 3 Nevertheless, the multilateral comparative approach has allowed us to
uncover deep flaws in country-specific accounts of the legal evolution of business forms.
More importantly, it has enabled us to challenge the idea that the standard of comparison
for business law should be the US or the UK.
3

For instance, the early passage of the income tax in the US means that we have very good data on the
stock of firms taking different organizational forms beginning around 1916. Similar data exist for
Germany after 1887, but they do not become available for France until the second half of the twentieth
century. The requirement that businesses organizing under the commercial code register with a local
authority means that we have very good data on the flow of new multi-owner firms for France and
Germany over long periods of time. For the US and UK it is possible to track the flow of corporations, but
not partnerships which were common law entities that did not even require a formal contract.
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The Advantage of the PLLC
The presumption that the corporation is the superior form of business organization
derives from the idea that only the corporation can support the capital deepening—in
particular, the growth of fixed assets in production—required for modern economic
growth. 4 By contrast, it has generally been assumed that the main alternative form, the
partnership, is too evanescent to provide the lock-in of capital necessary to sustain longterm investments. Because partnerships were legally dissolved by the death of a
principal, and because the courts interpreted them to be essentially at will, partners
always faced significant risk that their firm’s assets would have to be liquidated at a loss.
As a result, they were reluctant to make firm-specific, or otherwise illiquid investments. 5
Moreover, partnerships had other disadvantages as well, including unlimited liability,
collective management, and only a weak ability to shield the firm’s assets from its
owners’ doings. 6
If the advantages of the corporation over the partnership were as great as the
literature suggests, one should observe the former displacing the latter as soon as general
incorporation laws were passed. As we have already suggested (and will demonstrate in
greater detail below), this did not happen; in 1900 corporations were not the dominant
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See, for examples, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American
Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press); and Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Birdsall, Jr., How the
West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
5
Margaret M. Blair, “Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the
Nineteenth Century,” UCLA Law Review, 51 (Dec. 2003), pp. 387-455. For a contrary view, see Larry E.
Ribstein, “Why Corporations?” Berkeley Business Law Journal, 1 (Fall 2004), pp. 183-232.
6
On limited liability, see Susan E. Woodward, “Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 141 (Dec. 1985), pp. 601-11. On entity shielding, see Henry
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire, “Law and the Rise of the Firm,” Harvard Law Review,
119 (March 2006), pp. 1333-1403. For a theoretical discussion of the disadvantages of collective
management, see Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,” American Economic Review, 62 (Dec. 1972), pp. 777-95; and Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts,
and Financial Structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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organizational form in any of our countries. Of course, it is possible that the continued
popularity of partnerships resulted from restrictive general incorporation statutes and
regulations, not problems with the corporate form itself. For example, it is possible that
fees and other costs associated with taking out corporate charters were high enough to
discourage use of the form or that reporting requirements or laws mandating the public
disclosure of business information imposed a sufficiently onerous burden on firms to
suppress the number of corporations. 7 As we show, however, only in Germany, and
there only after 1884, did such regulations inhibit the formation of corporations.
A more likely possibility is that the corporate form was not as advantageous as the
literature would lead us to believe. The two major advantages of the corporate form—
concentrated management and perpetual life—brought with them significant costs. 8
Because the only members of a corporation who could make decisions on behalf of the
firm were officers who had been duly elected by its shareholders, any coalition that
determined the election of officers also controlled the firm. The coalition could then use
its power to benefit its members at the expense of other shareholders, and there was little
that the minority could do about it. They could not make the majority change its policies;
nor could they force the firm to dissolve. The problem was especially serious in
corporations whose capital stock was closely held because members of such firms could
not readily exit by selling their shares.
7

Today, of course, tax rules have significant effects on businesses’ organizational choices. Prior to the mid
twentieth century, however, most taxes were low, and to the extent that there were differences in the
treatment of corporations, they were of minor importance. As a result, for the purposes of this article we
largely set aside tax issues.
8
For a more extensive discussion of these costs, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal,
“Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States before the Great
Depression,” in Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America’s Economic History, ed. Edward L.
Glaeser and Claudia Goldin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 125-152; and Lamoreaux
and Rosenthal, “Contractual Tradeoffs and SMEs’ Choice of Organizational Form: A View from U.S. and
Frnech History, 1830-2000,” NBER Working Paper (2006).
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The choice of organizing a business as a corporation rather than a partnership thus
entailed tradeoffs. For some types of businesses, the costs associated with the
partnership’s inability to lock in capital (we call this the problem of untimely dissolution)
were higher than those associated with the cost of the dominant shareholders’
misbehavior in corporations (the problem of minority oppression). All other things being
equal, those businesses would prefer to organize as corporations than as partnerships.
For other businesses, however, the situation was just the reverse. In a world where there
were only two organizational choices, therefore, significant numbers of both partnerships
and corporations should coexist.
If this argument is correct, then the advantage of the PLLC would be its ability to
mitigate the starkness of the choice between partnerships and corporations. The idea here
is that the greater flexibility of the PLLC form allowed business people to combine
aspects of both partnerships and corporations—to trade off some additional risk of
minority oppression for less untimely dissolution or vice versa. Although, as we will see,
the particular attributes of the form differed somewhat across countries, as a general rule
organizers of PLLCs everywhere had an extraordinary degree of contractual flexibility.
They could write provisions into their articles of association that balanced the risks of
oppression against the possibility of stalemate and the costs of untimely dissolution
against the dangers of lock-in. To induce members of the firm to make enterprisespecific investments, for example, they could make dissolution difficult. But they could
also protect minority owners who made such investments by giving them veto power in
some circumstances. Moreover, they obtained all this flexibility without giving up
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important advantages of the corporation, such as limited liability, legal personality, and
entity shielding.
The basic argument we are proposing can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1,
where the horizontal axis indicates the size of the firm (here proxied by the number of
investors), and the vertical axis the firm’s profits as a fraction of what its earnings would
be if it did not have to bear any of these transaction costs. The solid line represents the
proportion of this Coasian maximum that representative partnerships of different sizes
would be expected to earn. It is drawn steeply downward sloping to capture the idea that
the probability of untimely dissolution is a rapidly increasing function of the number of
partners. The thin dashed line represents the corporation. We have drawn the line
upward sloping to capture the idea that the corporate form is more advantageous for large
firms than for small, but the shape of the line does not matter all that much. It could be
flat or even downward sloping, so long as it does not slope downward as steeply as the
partnership line (a possibility that is highly unrealistic, given that we observe relatively
few large firms organizing as partnerships). As we have drawn the diagram, the
partnership and corporation lines cross at firm sizes of around five investors. Firms
smaller than this size will organize as partnerships, because their profits will be higher
than if they adopt the corporate form. Firms with more than five investors will organize
as corporations for analogous reasons.
Now imagine that firms are given a third choice. They can also organize as
PLLCs, represented by the gently downward sloping thick dashed line. Because founders
of PLLCs can reduce the risk of untimely dissolution without increasing that of minority
oppression as much as in corporations, the form’s advantage over partnerships appears at

10

much lower firm sizes (in the diagram, around three investors), and the PLLC remains the
optimal form of organization until the corporation overtakes it at relatively large firm
sizes (at about seven investors). In the absence of the PLLC, some of the firms in the
range of three to six members would have chosen to be partnerships, and some would
have chosen to be corporations. The PLLC, in other words, “eats” both partnerships and
corporations.
The foregoing analysis assumes that all forms of organization are easy and cheap
to adopt. Partnerships and PLLCs certainly were, but it is important to consider the
possibility that fees and regulatory restrictions made the corporate form relatively
expensive. We can modify the diagram to capture these costs by shifting the corporation
line to the right and making it rise more steeply (see Figure 2). Under this alternative
scenario, which as we will see mimics the German case after 1884, the PLLC still
surpasses partnerships at the same size of firms as before, but in the absence of the PLLC,
partnerships are the preferred organizational form for firms with seven or less partners.
The PLLC’s introduction would mean a great reduction in the number of partnerships,
but not of corporations—that is, PLLCs would eat partnerships more than corporations.
Overall, however, the ratio of PLLCs to total enterprises should be pretty similar under
this scenario to what it was in the case where incorporation was cheap.
One could get similar results by shifting the partnership line up and to the right.
Such a shift might arise either because of the existence of intermediate forms like the
limited partnership or because business people could write enforceable contractual
clauses that limited partners’ ability to exit. The more general point to emphasize here is
that both the share of corporations in multi-owner firms and the popularity of PLLCs will
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depend on the preexisting set of legal rules governing alternative forms of business
organization.

Organizational Forms Before the PLLC
In all four of our countries the main alternative to the corporation before the
enactment of enabling legislation for the PLLC was the ordinary partnership. In France
and Germany, however, business people had other choices that mitigated the starkness of
the tradeoff between partnerships and corporations. The existence of these additional
choices reduced the appeal of the corporate form and, to some extent, affected the take-up
of the PLLC. Nonetheless, as we will show, the basic analysis still holds.
In France, as in the rest of our countries, corporations could not be formed in the
early nineteenth century without specific permission from the government. However, the
Code de Commerce of 1807 offered business people two options besides the ordinary
partnership (or société en nom collectif). The limited partnership (commandite simple)
allowed some partners to enjoy the protection of limited liability so long as they did not
play an active role in management. In addition, business people could organize
commandites par action, limited partnerships in which the shares of the limited partners
were tradable. An active market in these shares enabled commandites par action to secure
many of the advantages of corporations without obtaining special government
permission. 9

9

Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, “Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility: A
Comparison of Business’s Organizational Choices in France and the United States during the Era of
Industrialization,” American Law and Economics Review, 7 (Spring 2005), pp. 28-61.

12

German law, which was heavily influenced by French thinking, offered
businesses essentially the same choices. If they did not want to form an ordinary
partnership (Offene Handelsgesellschaft or OHG), they could become a simple limited
partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft or KG), or a limited partnership with tradable shares
(Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien or KGaA). After 1861 most German states agreed to
adopt a common code of business law (the ADHG or Allgemeine Deutsche
Handelsgesetzbuch), so the basic characteristics of these forms were the same across
states. 10
The additional contracting freedom that the various commandite forms gave
business people in France and Germany improved to some extent the terms of the
tradeoff they faced between untimely dissolution and minority oppression. On the one
hand, limited partnerships were set up for specific terms, and the limited partners could
not withdraw before the expiration of the contract. Hence the risk of untimely dissolution
was less than in an ordinary partnership. On the other hand, because silent partners could
not participate in the firm’s management, they were susceptible to exploitation by the
general partners. The extent of this problem was less than in a corporation, however,
because silent partners could retrieve their capital at the end of the contract if they felt
abused. 11
In Britain and the US business people did not have access to these alternative
forms. In Britain there was no enabling statute for limited partnerships until 1907—long

10

The first common business law for the Reich was passed in 1898, but the ADHG covered most aspects of
business organization at issue here. For more detail see Guinnane et al. 2007,Op cit.
11
Philippe Merle, Droit commercial; sociétés commerciale (6th edn.; Paris: Dalloz, 1998); Michel De
Juglart and Benjamin Ippolito, Les sociétés commerciales : cours de droit commercial. Paris:
Montchrestien, 1999); Protection des minoritaires: sociétés ne faisant pas appel public à l’épargne (Paris:
éditions Francis Lefebvre, 2001), p. 140.
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after the passage of general incorporation laws—and the courts effectively blocked all
efforts to create limited or sleeping partnerships contractually. 12 The situation was
similar in the US. Although most states passed laws during the 1820s and 1830s
permitting the formation of limited partnerships modeled on the commandite, the courts
construed these statutes so narrowly that they never provided a useful alternative to
ordinary partnerships. 13
Perhaps because of the lack of alternatives, Britain and the US led the way in the
passage of general incorporation laws. In Britain lobbying by opponents, particularly
competitors who sought to prevent rivals from obtaining corporate privileges, had made
corporate charters a rare and expensive commodity until the second quarter of the
nineteenth century. But then the political tides changed. Parliament empowered the
Board of Trade to charter corporations more freely and in 1844 enacted legislation
providing for general incorporation without limited liability and in 1855-56 with limited
liability. The 1862 Companies Act that consolidated prior legislation emphasized the
contractual nature of the corporation. It included a set of default articles of association
(called Table A) that incorporators could adopt in full, reject altogether and draft their
own articles of association, or adopt in part, substituting alternative provisions as
desired. 14
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Innovations such as the (unincorporated) joint-stock company made investors’ shares more liquid, but
could not overcome the central defects of the partnership, which they still were at law. One possible
alternative, the trust, did not evolve sufficiently before the advent of general incorporation to provide
business people with a real choice. The Companies Act of 1844, which introduced general incorporation,
legislated the end of the unincorporated company. It declared unregistered joint-stock companies illegal
and prohibited the formation of partnerships with more than 25 members. See Ron Harris, Industrializing
English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization, 1720-1844 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
13
Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility.”
14
Harris, Industrializing English Law; and Bishop Carleton Hunt, The Development of the Business
Corporation in England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936).

14

In the United States the federal Constitution left incorporation to the states.
Massachusetts and New York passed general incorporation laws for manufacturing as
early as 1809 and 1811 respectively, as part of a patriotic effort to stimulate domestic
industry during the Jeffersonian embargo. Over the next four decades the number and
coverage of such laws increased dramatically. Although many states, especially in New
England, had been quite liberal in granting charters by special legislative act, efforts to
democratize corporate privileges—to make them available to all rather than a favored
few—spurred the passage of general incorporation laws. By the early 1850s most states
had made obtaining a corporate charter for most types of businesses a simple
administrative process. 15
Until France adopted full general incorporation in 1867, the government had
granted corporate charters sparingly. Only 642 corporations were authorized between
1800 and 1867. 16 By way of comparison, in Massachusetts 2,062 corporations were
chartered by special act between 1800 and 1862. 17 For most of this time, the demand for
general incorporation had been muted in France by the availability of the share
commandite form. In 1857, however, a financial crisis brought complaints about abuses
by the share commandites’ general partners to a crescendo, and the government enacted a
new law that made it more costly to organize such enterprises. Once the crisis abated, the
15

See Pauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” William and Mary
Quarterly, 50 (Jan. 1993), pp. 53-58; and W. C. Kessler, “A Statistical Study of the New York General
Incorporation Act of 1811,” Journal of Political Economy, 48 (Dec. 1940), pp. 877-82; Hurst, Legitimacy
of the Business Corporation, pp. 13-57; Susan Pace Hamill, “From Special Privilege to General Utility: A
Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations,” American University Law Review, 81 (Oct. 1999),
pp. 81-180.
16
Charles E. Freedeman, Joint-Stock Enterprise in France, 1807-1867: From Privileged Company to
Modern Corporation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); and Freedeman, The
Triumph of Corporate Capitalism in France, 1867-1914 (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press,
1993).
17
William C. Kessler, “Incorporation in New England: A Statistical Study, 1800-1875,” Journal of
Economic History, 8 (May), pp. 43-62.
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restrictions proved burdensome, spurring efforts to secure more liberal incorporation
rules. New legislation in 1863 permitted firms with a maximum capital of 20 million
francs to organize as corporations without receiving special permission from the state.
However, the burdens placed on directors and managers by the law of 1857 remained,
and were even to some extent increased by the requirement that directors own at least 5
percent of the equity. The act of 1867 removed the limit on capitalization and subjected
both corporations and share commandites to the same (more liberal) regulations. In
particular, the burdens of responsibility on directors were reduced and the minimum
ownership requirements eliminated. 18
In Germany the ADHG created a uniform law of corporations, but left the matter
of general incorporation to the member states. The Hanseatic cities were the first to
allow general incorporation. The North German Confederation (led by Prussia) followed
in 1870, and the provision was carried over into Reich law in 1871. 19 Two types of
pressures played a role in the shift to general incorporation. First, governments
recognized that tight control of corporate charters had not prevented the creation of largescale enterprises because business people were able to use the device of the KGaA
successfully to raise capital on the market. For example, the Disconto-Gesellschaft took
the form of a KGaA during the years 1856-67, when it was also the largest bank in
Germany. 20 Second, prior to general incorporation some states had been relatively liberal
in granting corporate charters, often seeking tax revenue or other favors from
corporations that would be legally sited in their territory but actually do most of their
18

Freedeman, Joint-Stock Enterprise in France, pp. 132-35.
Nobert Horn, “Aktienrechtliche Unternehmensorganisation in der Hochindustrialisierung (1860-1920),”
in Recht und Entwicklung der Grossunternehmen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Norbert Horn
and Jürgen Kocka (Götting: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), p. 128 and note 22.
20
Carsten Burhop, Die Kreditbanken in der Gründerzeit (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), p. 84.
19
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business elsewhere in the Zollverein. State governments learned the hard way that a
restrictive policy would not prevent corporations operating in their territories but rather
that it would only lead to their being chartered in another German state. 21

The Slow Take-Up of the Corporation
Regardless of the timing of the passage of general incorporation laws, if the
corporation was the obviously superior form that the literature makes it out to be, we
should observe that such legislation led everywhere to large increases in the number of
corporations. In both France and Germany, however, the corporation proved to be much
less popular than in the US or the UK. On the eve of World War I there were still only
about 5,000 corporations in Germany and 13,000 in France, compared to almost 63,000
in the UK and over 250,000 in the US. 22 Moreover, as we will show, even in the US and
Britain the majority of multi-owner firms continued to organize as partnerships rather
than corporations.
Figure 3 displays the distribution of new firms taking multi-owner forms in
France for the period 1852-1978. 23 The passage of the 1867 general incorporation act led
to a surge in the number of firms organizing as corporations, but except for a brief boom
during the late 1870s, corporations never accounted for more than 10 percent of new
firms taking multi-owner forms before World War I. Partnerships became relatively less
common during this period, though they still accounted for at least 60 percent of new
21
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registrations. Moreover, some of the drop in their use reflected the renewed popularity of
the commandite simple at the end of the nineteenth century. Commandites par action
suffered a permanent decline, but even they did not completely disappear, although they
might be considered inferior substitutes for the corporation. Schneider, the large iron and
steel works, remained a commandite par action until the 1960s, and Michelin is still one
today.
The relatively small number of corporations organized in France after the passage
of the 1867 law does not seem to have been the result of high fees or a heavy regulatory
burden. The taxes that firms paid did not differ across organizational forms until after
World War II, and the additional disclosure requirements that corporations had to meet
were modest because the stringent requirements of the 1857 law were removed. After
1907 corporations that raised capital from the public had to issue a prospectus and file a
copy of their articles of association, a list of their initial shareholders, and the minutes of
their first shareholders’ meeting. But partnerships also had to register a list of their
members and file a copy of their articles of association. Registration fees were
essentially the same across organizational forms. Although it was more common for
corporations to have their articles of association notarized (a process that cost one percent
of capital), this extra step was not required by law. 24 It is likely, therefore, that the
limited take-up of corporations is explained by the availability of commandite, which
offered firms some protection against untimely dissolution without imposing as much
risk of minority oppression as the corporation.
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The organizational forms adopted by new firms registered in Prussia from 18671932 are displayed in Figure 4. 25 The passage of a general incorporation law brought a
brief upsurge in the corporation’s popularity as Prussian entrepreneurs quickly took
advantage of their new freedom. 26 As in France, however, the corporation did not
replace the ordinary partnership, which continued to dominate the registration of multiowner firms. For every new corporation formed, there were at least 16 new partnerships
of all types in 1882 and as many as 41 in 1892. The KG also remained a popular form of
organization for new firms. Indeed, when an ordinary partnership changed its legal form,
the new entity was more likely to be a KG than a corporation.
The number of new corporations was particularly large during the
“Gründerboom” of 1871-73, when the rapid payment of the indemnity imposed after the
Franco-Prussian war produced a short-lived stock-market bubble. 27 Many of the new
enterprises reflected over-heated expectations or outright fraud, and the collapse of the
bubble brought a number of them down. Of the 1,005 corporations formed during the
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period 1867-1873, 123 were in liquidation by September 1874, and another 37 were in
bankruptcy. 28
Fallout from the bubble’s collapse led in 1884 to legislation aimed at enhancing
the power of shareholders and preventing abuses in the formation of new enterprises.
One set of reforms strengthened the role of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and
required firms to provide more detailed reports on their financial condition. 29 Other
changes raised the minimum size of a share ten-fold, to 1,000 Marks, and forbade new
corporations from operating until all their shares had been subscribed. Firms that
converted to the corporate form could not list their shares on the stock market for one
year after the reorganization. 30
The 1884 law undoubtedly made the corporate form less attractive to
entrepreneurs, and the number of incorporations never again exceeded 400 per year for
the rest of the century. 31 Some enterprises that one would expect a priori to be organized
as corporations retained another form. Jürgen Kocka and Hannes Siegrist report that 15 of
the 100 largest industrial enterprises in Germany in 1887 were Personengesellschaften
(either partnerships or single-owner firms). In 1907, the number was still 7 out of 100. 32
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Even today, some of the most important German firms are organized as partnerships or
one type or another. Merck’s German headquarters company is a KGaA, for example. 33
While today, taxes play an important, and sometimes determining, role in entrepreneurs’
choices about legal structure for their firms, this was not the case prior to World War I.
British and American entrepreneurs did not have any real alternative to the
corporation besides the ordinary partnership. Hence it is not surprising that they adopted
the corporate form more rapidly than their French or German counterparts. Yet even in
Anglo-Saxon countries the majority of firms continued to organize as partnerships for
many decades after the passage of general incorporation laws. In the US competition
among states for charters during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries eroded
most regulatory restrictions on corporations and kept the cost of securing a charter low. 34
New incorporations rose twentyfold between 1870 (when several thousand corporations
were already being chartered each year) and 1925. 35 Nonetheless, data from the US
Census of Manufacturers reveal that as late as 1900—that is, more than half a century
after most states passed general incorporation laws—partnerships still constituted more
than 60 percent of multi-owner firms in the manufacturing sector. Although the
proportion of manufacturing firms organized as partnerships fell during the early
twentieth century as the scale of enterprise rose, dropping to about 40 percent by 1920, it
did not fall much further until after World War II. According to Internal Revenue
Deutschland, Frankreich, England und den USA, eds. Norbert Horn and Jürgen Kocka (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), pp. 80-81, Tables 1 and 2.
33
The general partner is an OHG owned by the Merck family. Other large partnerships in Germany today
include Henkel KGaA and the Oppenheim banking firm.
34
Arthur K. Kuhn, A Comparative Study of the Law of Corporations with Particular Reference to the
Protection of Creditors and Shareholders (New York: Columbia University, 1912); Christopher Grandy,
“The Economics of Multiple Governments: New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929,”
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Service (IRS) data, as late as 1947 partnerships constituted fully 40 percent of
manufacturing enterprises taking multi-owner forms, and their proportion of firms in the
economy as a whole exceeded 60 percent (see Table 1). Only in the aftermath of the war,
when there were substantial tax advantages to organizing as corporations, did the
proportion of partnerships begin a steep decline. 36
Although there are no similar datasets for Britain, available estimates show
partnerships to be similarly persistent. In 1872 the Committee on Partnerships
considered the practicality of requiring registration of trade partnerships. An interested
witness who appeared before the committee estimated that 200,000 to 300,000 firms
would be affected. A more conservative estimate from 1885 put the number of “important
partnerships” in the economy at about 100,000 and calculated that limited liability
companies accounted for at the most 5 to 10 percent of “important business
organizations,” excluding one-man concerns. The few other surveys and estimates that
are available indicate that the percentage of large enterprises in the iron and steel and
shipping industries that were organized as corporations increased during the last two
decades of the nineteenth century. In the cotton industry there was a similar increase in
the early twentieth century. Hence, even in sectors dominated by large firms, it took fifty
years or more after the enactment of general incorporation for the corporate form to
dominate. Estimates of the organizational forms adopted by SMEs are both scarcer and
less reliable, yet it seems quite safe to conclude that most such enterprises were still
partnerships at the time of the introduction of the PLLC in Britain. 37
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In none of our four countries, therefore, is the historical record consistent with the
notion that the corporation is the superior form of organization. Relatively few
corporations were formed in France and Germany, and even in the US and the UK the
majority of multi-owner firms continued to organize as partnerships long after the
corporate form was readily available. Only in Germany (and even there only after 1884)
can the unpopularity of the form be blamed on regulatory restrictions. More generally,
business people avoided the corporation because there were other organizational forms
that better met their needs. In the UK and US entrepreneurs who did not want to worry
about oppression chose to bear the cost of untimely dissolution and organize as
partnerships. In France and Germany entrepreneurs had another option, the limited
partnership, that gave them more protection against untimely dissolution without forcing
them to bear as much risk of oppression as the corporation. Thus even fewer French and
German firms found the corporation an attractive alternative.

The GmbH and its Take-up in Germany
The passage of enabling legislation for PLLCs in Germany was a direct
consequence of the 1884 reforms, which made the formation of new AGs so costly that
many thought they had contributed to the growing concentration of economic power in
Germany. Demands for change included calls for revising the AG as well as for the
creation of a new form of enterprise. Formal consideration of the latter possibility began
in 1888 when the Prussian Minister of Commerce asked the German Commercial
Association to discuss the desirability of new corporate forms at its next meeting. After
consultation with this and other interested groups, the Ministry of Justice circulated a
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draft version of a law creating the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (company with
limited liability, later usually abbreviated GmbH). The Reichstag enacted the law in
1892, modifying the form slightly when the new commercial code (HGB) was introduced
in 1898. 38
Two or more business people could create a GmbH simply by entering legally
valid articles of association (Gesellschaftsvertrag) in the relevant commercial register. A
GmbH had to have an issued capital (Stammkapital) of at least 20,000 Marks. 39 This
capital could be divided into shares (that did not have to be of equal value), but no share
could be less than 500 Marks. An important difference between a GmbH and an AG was
that transfer of a share in a GmbH required a notarial contract. As a result, the cost of
transfers was higher, and shares could not trade on stock markets. 40 Otherwise, the law
imposed few constraints on the organizers of a GmbH. For example, a GmbH could have
a supervisory committee, but unlike an AG it was not required to have one. All that a
GmbH needed was one or more managers (Gesellschaftsführer), who might but did not
have to be shareholders. Because the managers represented the firm legally, their names
had to be entered in the commercial registry. By law stockholders had an unequivocal
right to dismiss managers whenever they wanted. 41
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Most important organizational matters were left to the firm’s owners, although the
law did stipulate some default rules, allowing the articles of association to be brief and
simple. A GmbH could be formed for a limited period of time or without a specified
term; in either case investors were protected against the threat of untimely dissolution by
a default rule that required the approval of three-quarters by value of the shares to wind
up the firm. Under the default rules, however, this protection came at the cost of an
increased risk of minority oppression similar to that of a corporation. Each 100 Marks of
invested capital was to be treated as a single vote, and simple majorities carried in
elections for managers and for most corporate decisions, making it possible for owners
representing 51 percent of the capital to impose their will on those owning 49 percent.
But these were only default provisions. Organizers could agree to other rules on these
matters, trading off more risk of untimely dissolution against less danger of minority
oppression, if they so chose.
Looking again at Figure 4, which reports estimates of the choices made by new
firms that registered in Prussia at five-year intervals starting with 1867, we can see that
the GmbH’s popularity grew slowly during its first decade of existence. By 1912,
however, about one-third of new firms took the form, and by 1932 GmbHs accounted for
about half of all new registrations. As expected, the advent of the GmbH had little effect
on the proportion of new firms organized as AGs. Both before and after the 1892
legislation corporations were extremely rare; only about 20 were formed in Prussia each
January between 1872 and 1912, despite considerable economic growth over the period.

see Timothy W. Guinnane, et al., “Putting the Corporation in its Place,” Enterprise and Society,
forthcoming.
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Because of the high cost of incorporation, only those businesses for which the form
offered significant advantages were likely to take out charters. 42
The GmbH also had little effect on the Kommandit, which remained a reasonably
constant eight percent of all registrations. Instead, the GmbH’s primary impact, as our
theory would predict, was to provide limited liability and a share-capital structure to
firms that otherwise would have decided to forego these advantages and organize as
partnerships, either because the costs associated with forming an AG were too high or
because of the greater risk of minority oppression that organizing as an AG or a KG
entailed. The share of ordinary partnerships fell steadily after the GmbH was enacted,
dropping in Prussia from nearly 90 percent in 1892 to less than 40 percent four decades
later, and it is reasonable to assume that the effect on partnerships would have been even
greater if the minimum capital requirement for GmbHs had not been set so high. In 1913
about one-third of all Prussian GmbHs had precisely the threshold 20,000 Marks of
Stammkapital. 43

The Private Limited Company in Britain
The story of the advent of the PLLC in Britain was remarkably similar to that in
Germany. Mounting complaints that promoters were swindling external investors led
Parliament to pass the Companies Act of 1900 regulating public offerings of securities.
The law required each company issuing shares to publish a prospectus that would provide
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investors with detailed information about the enterprise. It restricted companies’ ability
to allocate shares to organizers or others who did not pay for them fully in cash, required
the public registration of mortgages and other charges as a means of protecting unsecured
creditors, and mandated the circulation of audited balance sheets at annual meetings of
shareholders. Finally, it subjected directors to personal liability if they failed to conform
to its provisions. 44
Although the purpose of the law was to protect investors in publicly held
companies, it raised the costs of organizing all types of corporations, whether they issued
shares to the public or not. Like its 1884 predecessor in Germany, the law made the
corporate form less attractive, especially to SMEs, leading to a drop in the number of
companies registered from 5,082 in 1897 and 4,849 in 1900 to 3,343 in 1901 and 3,725 in
1904. 45 It also provoked mounting protests from the business community. Parliament
finally responded in 1905 by setting up the Loreburn/Warmington Committee to consider
additional changes to the law. The recommendations of that committee led Parliament to
enact an amendment to the Companies Act in 1907 creating the private limited
company. 46
It is interesting to note that the new form was not modeled on the GmbH.
Although the committee that had proposed the 1900 reforms had collected comparative
information on organizational forms, in the case of Germany it was mainly interested in
the AG. It obtained only a brief description of the GmbH and did not recommend
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enabling legislation for the PLLC. 47 Intriguingly, the Loreburn/Warmington Committee,
which did consider and recommend such legislation, made no reference in its report to
the GmbH as a useful form, or even as a model to avoid. It took a different approach and
recommended features that were indigenously British. 48
The 1907 Act distinguished public from private companies and subjected the
former to stricter rules and higher disclosure requirements than the latter. According to
Section 37(1) of the Act, a private company “means a company which by its articles” 1)
restricts the right to transfer its shares, 2) limits the number of its shareholders to fifty;
and 3) prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or debentures of
the company. 49 Whereas in Germany a company became private by organizing under a
different law from a corporation, in Britain a company became private by including in its
articles of association the above provisions.
Restrictions on the transferability of shares typically consisted of provisions that
required the consent of the board or other shareholders or that mandated that the shares
be offered to other members of the firm. Although such provisions increased minority
shareholders’ vulnerability to oppression, business people could adopt governance rules
that redressed the imbalance of power. The organizers of a company could opt out of the
default rule (one vote per share whenever a poll was required) by including a different
provision in the original articles of association, so it was possible for minority
shareholders to protect themselves by increasing their voting rights or requiring
supermajority votes on issues for which such a rule was not mandated by law.
Subsequent alterations to the articles of association required a supermajority of 75
47
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percent, however, as did a voluntary winding up of the company. A company could be
dissolved involuntarily by the court, but only for cause—for example, inability to pay
debts or a finding that it was “just and equitable” to wind up the company. 50
Figure 5 reports the proportion of new companies that organized as corporations
(public companies) compared to those that organized as PLLCs (private companies). As
the figure shows, the PLLC form was enormously popular almost immediately. The
number of new firms that organized as public corporations averaged 4,102 from 1902 to
1906. It then dropped steeply to an average of 712 in 1912-16, 512 in 1922-26, 296 in
1932-36, and 37 in 1942-47. By contrast, the number of new firms that organized as
PLLCs rose from average of 4,853 in 1907-12, immediately following the legislation, to
7,936 in 1922-26, to 12,350 in 1932-36. During the period 1922-26 PLLCs constituted
fully 93 percent of new firms taking the company form. 51 Although our data do not
allow us to compare the average size of firms organizing as PLLCs with that of firms
organizing as public companies, we note that the change in the law was accompanied by
an increase in the number of small firms registering as companies. In 1901 only 34.7
percent of newly formed companies had a registered capital of £5,000 or less. In 1908
the percentage was 47.4, and by 1936 it had risen to 76.2. The correlation between the
increase in the number of PLLCs and the rise in the number of companies with less than
£5,000 in capital suggests that there was a substantial take-up of the PLLC form by small
enterprises.
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The SARL in France
Despite ongoing discussion of the desirability of reforming France’s general
incorporation law, little changed between 1867 and 1925. The end of World War I and
the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine created an impetus for innovation, however.
Business people in the recovered territories had been able to avail themselves of the
GmbH form since 1892. There were at least 400 GmbHs operating in Alsace and
Lorraine, and their owners showed little interest in converting to partnerships,
commandites, or corporations. 52 Instead, they pressured Paris to enact an enabling law
for GmbHs. In 1919 a bill that essentially translated the GmbH statute into French was
introduced in the Assembly, but it faced staunch chauvinistic opposition and was
withdrawn almost immediately: after four years in the trenches the victors did not want
to imitate the losers. Although business people in Alsace and Lorraine were
disappointed, the failure to pass a law galvanized more widespread support for reform.
Local chambers of commerce throughout France urged the passage of some version of
the legislation, and a new bill was introduced in 1921 to create the Société à
Responsabilité Limitée. 53 For reasons that remain unclear, the bill lay dormant until 1925,
when the Assembly approved it by a unanimous voice vote. After an expedited
procedure, the Senate unanimously concurred. Whatever the politics that led to the
adoption of the law, when French legislators finally acted, they charted a course that was
substantially different from that of either Germany or Britain. 54
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Business people could create an SARL simply by entering legally valid articles of
incorporation (Statuts) in the relevant commercial register. As in the German case there
was emphasis on reducing disclosure and transactions costs. Hence although firms had to
register, their articles of association could be drawn up private agreement—without the
burden of notary fees. As in Germany there was a minimum capital, 25,000 francs, but
given the low value of the franc, this constraint was not too onerous. The capital had to
be divided into shares of 100 francs or more each. 55
Unlike partnerships, SARLs were joint-stock firms. As a result, they were not
dissolved by the death of an associate; the shares simply passed to the members’ heirs.
Nor could an SARL be dissolved simply by the desire of a member to withdraw. SARLs
thus seem to have solved the main problem faced by French partnerships: impermanence.
As was the case for the GmbH and the private company, shares of SARLs could not be
publicly traded. The French went further, however, and subjected private sales of shares
to the approval of other shareholders. The owners of a quarter of the shares could veto
any trade. Unlike the German case, if a trade was approved, the sale could be finalized
without recourse to a notary. 56
On the surface shareholders in SARLs were more at risk of minority oppression
than was the case for GmbHs in Germany or private companies in Britain, for SARLs had
to follow strict one-share-one-vote rules. But if the managers were named in the articles
of association, they could not be removed except through litigation. This ability to name
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or not name managers added flexibility to the form. Consider the case of an SARL with
no dominant shareholder. Depending on how the company’s articles of association were
written, the firm could either be structured like a private corporation, where management
could be voted out, or like a commandite simple, where the managers could not be
removed without dissolving the firm. If all the members of the firm owned the same
number of shares, an SARL could even be structured like a partnership, where all
members had equal control rights.
As Figure 3 shows, once the form became available in 1925, SARLs very quickly
accounted for the vast majority of new enterprises registered in France. The form seems
to have been particularly attractive to firms that had small numbers of investors but
whose capital requirements were much larger than those of most partnerships. In 1927,
for example, 57 percent of the firms that organized as SARLs had only two associates,
but the average capital of new SARLs was more than twice that of new partnerships
(including limited as well as ordinary). SARLs were much smaller (in terms of capital)
than the relatively few corporations that continued to form. In 1927, their average capital
was less than a quarter that of new SAs, and only 10 percent of the SARLs organized in
that year had a capital as large as the median SA formed in the same period. The median
capital of new SARLs was 100,000 francs, four times the minimum required by the
law. 57 Even though the capital of most SARLs suggest they would have been
partnerships or commandites in the absence of legal innovation, firms in the largest two
deciles were big enough that they would most likely have been corporations.
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Germany, Britain, and France Compared
In order to compare the experience of these three countries with each other, we
must adopt a uniform time frame and allow for differences in the type of data to which
we have access. Measuring from the year in which the initial enabling legislation for
PLLCs was passed, we use two different standards of comparison. The first, which we
can calculate for all three countries, is the proportion of joint-stock firms that chose the
PLLC form, where we count as joint-stock firms all corporations, limited partnerships
with tradable shares, and, of course, PLLCs. The second, which we can only compute for
France and Germany, is the share of all firms taking multi-owner forms that chose to
organize as PLLCs.
By our first measure, the Prussian, British and French patterns look rather similar
(see Figure 6). After the passage of enabling legislation for the PLLC, an overwhelming
fraction of new joint-stock firms in all three countries chose this form. Nonetheless, this
common pattern hides substantial differences among the three countries. In France the
costs of organizing a corporation were much lower than in Germany, and the enactment
of enabling legislation for PLLCs there had a much greater effect on the number of new
corporations. Corporations were even more popular in Britain than in France, and, as we
have seen, the advent of the PLLC practically wiped them out.
Although we do not have the data we need to include the British case in Figure 7,
we know that the advent of the private limited company also reduced the number of
partnerships, but not nearly to the same extent as in France. Partnerships also experienced
a much less dramatic collapse in Germany than in France. Part of the explanation may be
the more stringent minimum capital requirement for the GmbH. Firms with
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capitalizations below 20,000 Marks had no choice in Germany but to organize as
partnerships, and as we have seen this constraint seems to have been binding. But part of
the explanation may have been a unique feature of German law, which enabled members
of any form to name a Prokurist who could speak authoritatively for the firm, giving the
German OHG or KG some of the advantages of legal personality. 58 The Prokurist
allowed ordinary (or limited) partnerships to solve one of the problems with this form of
organization by concentrating all authority in one person.
In Germany the GmbH had little effect on the proportion of new firms that took
the Kommandit form, whereas in France the advent of the SARL led business people to
all but abandon limited partnerships. This result is not too surprising when one considers
the position in these two countries of managers with only minority stakes in their
enterprises. Because such managers had to worry about whether they would be pushed
out by dominant shareholders, in Germany the GmbH had relatively little appeal
compared to a KG because shareholders in a GmbH could dismiss a manager at will. By
contrast, managers in a similar position in France could entrench themselves in an SARL
by registering their names along with the firm’s articles of association. Hence the SARL
had a greater effect on the use of the commandite form than the GmbH had on the KG.
Across our three European countries, the extent to which the PLLC reduced the
number of new corporations thus seems to have been inversely correlated with the prior
attractiveness of the corporate form, which in turn depended on the cost of organizing as
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a corporation and the availability of alternative forms. Although more work on this point
needs to be done, the effect of the PLLC on other organizational forms in France and
Germany seems to have owed to specific features of the enabling legislation passed in
each country, as well as to the specific features of the available alternatives. Why
partnerships remained relatively popular in Britain is not so obvious. Their informal
character may be one reason; in Britain partners did not have to register their firm or even
express their relationship in a written contract. In addition, the lack of intermediate forms
may have made conversion to a company, even a private one, a bigger legal step than was
the case on the continent. It is also possible that the refusal of the common law courts to
intervene in the internal affairs of business organizations may have made business people
who were concerned about minority oppression less willing to forego the ability to exit at
will. 59

The US and the Conservatism of the Common Law
For all practical purposes US business people did not obtain the PLLC form or its
equivalent until the second half of the twentieth century, when states began to modify
their general incorporation statutes to allow SMEs the flexibility that Europeans took for
granted. There was, however, an attempt to introduce the PLLC form in the US even
earlier than in Germany. In 1874 Pennsylvania passed a statute that gave any three or
more persons engaged in “any lawful business or occupation” the opportunity to organize
as a “partnership association,” a legal entity whose shares were not tradable but whose
“capital shall alone be liable for the debts of such association.” Similar enabling
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legislation for partnership associations was soon adopted in Michigan (1877), New Jersey
(1880), and Ohio (1881). Virginia also passed a statute in 1874 but repealed it in 1918. 60
Partnership associations, like GmbHs and SARLs, could be formed simply by
filing a document with a local (in this case county) official. They could only be dissolved
before the end of their term by vote of a majority of the associates in number and value of
interest and thus entailed less risk of untimely dissolution than ordinary partnerships.
However, the flexibility that partnerships associations had to adopt voting rules that
protected the interests of minority shareholders varied somewhat from state to state.
Whereas associations in New Jersey and Ohio could adopt whatever voting rules they
wished, an amendment to the Pennsylvania law specified that managers were to be
elected by a majority in value of interest. Regardless, minority shareholders always had
the ability to exit if they disagreed with the actions of the majority. Although individuals
who purchased shares could only participate in the business of the association if a
“majority of the members in number and value of their interests” so voted, any transferee
not admitted to the business would be reimbursed for his or her shares at a price that was
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either mutually agreed upon or, if no agreement could be reached, determined by the
local Court of Common Pleas. 61
Although passage of the Pennsylvania statute led an initial wave of firms to adopt
the PLLC form, including some famous enterprises such as the Carnegie Steel Company,
Ltd., the form did not spread beyond the initial group of states and even in these its use
petered out within a couple of decades. In effect, the vaunted common-law courts killed
the form. In a series of important cases, Pennsylvania courts determined that if the
registration document filed by a partnership association was incorrect in some material
respect, or if the list of the association’s capital made it “difficult to judge of values” by
lumping different items together, the association in effect had never formed and its
members were fully liable for their enterprise’s debts. 62 The Pennsylvania courts, in
other words, gave creditors of insolvent partnership associations an invitation to litigate
in the hopes that they would be able to demonstrate deficiencies in the registration
document and collect from the individual members of firm.
What is particularly interesting about this series of decisions was that the rule for
corporations was just opposite: their existence was presumed. The courts justified
treating partnership associations differently from corporations by highlighting a couple of
distinctions between the two forms. Although for convenience partnership associations
were “clothed with many of the features and powers of a corporation,” in a partnership
association, unlike a corporation, “no man can purchase the interest of a member and
participate in the subsequent business, unless by a vote of a majority of the members in
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number and value of their interests.” Moreover, the state did not grant a partnership
association a charter; its privileges rested entirely on the statement submitted at the time
of registration. As a result, it was “competent” for a plaintiff suing for payment of a debt
“either to point to a fatal defect” in the statement “or to prove that an essential requisite,
though formally stated, is falsely stated.” 63
The conservative standard imposed by the Pennsylvania courts was exacerbated
by the decentralized character of business law in the US. Organizational forms were
governed by the states, not the federal government, though businesses often operated in
many states at the same time. As a consequence, there was a great deal of uncertainty
about how business forms developed in one state would be interpreted by the courts of
another. In a Massachusetts case, for example, a Pennsylvania partnership association
was held to be an ordinary partnership whose members bore full unlimited liability. In
addition, for at least some purposes federal courts treated partnership associations as if
they were partnerships. 64
Although British businesses were spared the uncertainties of federalism, they too
suffered from the conservatism of the common law. The longstanding hostility of the
courts to limited partnerships may explain why a 1907 law enabling that form had little
consequence. 65 By contrast, the 1907 statute for private limited companies was successful
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because it was such a modest innovation. In effect all that the law did was exempt SMEs
from the burdensome regulatory requirements that Parliament had imposed to prevent
abuses by companies whose shares were publicly traded. Businesses that organized as
private limited companies still benefited from a half century or more of case law on
corporations.
For analogous reasons the modifications that many US states made to their
corporation laws during the second quarter of the twentieth century were much more
successful at providing business people with the advantages of the PLLC form than the
early partnership association statutes had been. The impetus for the change seems to
have come from the high level of personal relative to corporate income taxes in the postWorld War II period. 66 To reduce their taxes business people increasingly chose to
organize their enterprises as corporations rather than partnerships (see Tables 1 and 2),
and this shift seems to have created the critical mass needed to push for changes that
made the corporate form more suitable for SMEs. 67 The first significant break occurred
in North Carolina in 1955. Imbedded in that state’s new Business Corporation Act were
several provisions aimed specifically at small, closely held firms, including one declaring
that agreements among all the shareholders of such corporations shall not, regardless of
their form or purpose, “be invalidated on the ground that [their] effect is to make the
General Annual Report under the Companies (Winding-up) Act of 1890 (London, 1900-1921); UK Board
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parties partners among themselves.” The North Carolina statute also contained a
provision that made it possible for any stockholder to precipitate a judicial dissolution if
the corporation’s charter or any other written agreement among all the shareholders
entitled “the complaining shareholder to liquidation or dissolution of the corporation at
will or upon the occurrence of some event which has subsequently occurred.” 68 In other
words, North Carolina’s law now permitted members of corporations to protect
themselves against minority oppression by assuming a greater risk of untimely
dissolution.
About a dozen other states passed similar statutes over the next thirty years. Still
others modified their general incorporation laws in ways that increased the flexibility of
the form and/or gave judges greater power to intervene in, and even dissolve, closely held
corporations in which there were problems of internal dissension or minority oppression.
Nonetheless, as late as the 1980s legal scholars were still voicing the opinion that much
more needed to be done in the US to free “close corporations from the restraints of rigid
corporate norms,” to give members of these firms more flexibility to intermix attributes
of both the partnership and corporate forms in organizing their enterprises. 69
Legislation during Ronald Reagan’s presidency reversed the tax calculus, and
again these changes seem to have provided the impetus for legislative innovation. After
the IRS determined in 1988 that firms organized as Limited Liability Companies (LLCs)

68

O’Neal, “Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation,” pp. 647-48.
Kelvin H. Dickinson, “Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The Emergence and Legitimacy of the
Incorporated Partnership,” American University Law Review, 33 (Spring 1984), p. 600. See also O’Neal,
“Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation,” and “Close Corporations”; (Dickinson 1984;
see also Robert W. Hillman, “The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A
Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations,” Minnesota Law
Review, 67 (Oct. 1982), pp. 1-88; and Mark R. von Sternberg, “The Close Corporation’s Counterparts in
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Study,” Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review, 5 (Winter 1982), pp. 291-322.
69

40

under a Wyoming statute would be taxed as partnerships, other states quickly passed
similar laws, explicitly writing the bills to conform to the terms of the ruling. 70 A second
wave of statutes for Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) quickly followed. 71 The latter
laws permitted all members of an ordinary partnership to limit their liability for the firm’s
future debts simply by filing appropriate notice. Although LLCs and LLPs are in many
respects similar, the two forms differ in the way they trade off untimely dissolution and
minority oppression. LLPs are more like partnerships in the sense that members can
easily exit at will. LLCs are more like close corporations: Except where the firm’s
governing agreement explicitly provides for exit, members are stuck unless internal
dissension or oppression becomes severe enough to secure the intervention of the
courts. 72 In combination, these new forms greatly increased the contractual choices
available to business people in the US. Moreover, other statutes enacted around the same
time further expanded the menu of options. The most notable was Delaware’s 1988 law
on statutory business trusts which gave business people virtually complete contractual
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freedom to organize their enterprises. The legislation did not even specify any default
provisions. 73
There is no information on the number of businesses that organized under the
close corporate statutes passed during the third quarter of the twentieth century or that
took advantage of the increased contractual flexibility offered by many states’
modifications of their general incorporation laws. We do know, however, that the
proportion of firms taking multi-owner forms that were organized as partnerships
dropped from 60 percent in 1949 to 34 percent in 1979 (see Table 2). Although this
decline could be taken as evidence that businesses responded to this liberalization by
shifting toward the corporate form, the fall could also have resulted from the more
favorable tax treatment afforded corporations during those years. We also know that
business people displayed considerable enthusiasm for the new LLC form by the end of
the twentieth century. According to the IRS, in 1993 (the first year for which figures are
available) there were only about 17,000 LLCs in the US. By 1997 the number was nearly
350,000, and by 2002 it exceeded 946,000. There is no way of knowing what proportion
of new firms organized as LLCs, but in 2002 LLCs constituted 12 percent of all multiowner enterprises in the US economy, up from around considerably less than 1 percent in
1993. Most of this gain seems to have come at the expense of ordinary partnerships,
whose proportion of the total declined from 22 percent in 1993 to 12 percent in 2002 (the
share of limited partnerships actually increased from about 4 to 6 percent). By contrast,
the proportion of multi-owner firms organized as corporations dropped only slightly,
from 73 percent in 1993 to 70 percent in 2002. The relatively small decline in the
proportion of corporations suggests that the changes states made to their incorporation
73
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statutes after World War II did in fact considerably increase business people’s contractual
freedom, remedying most of the disadvantages of corporations that had enabled
partnerships to remain so popular for so long.

The Contractual Flexibility of the PLLC
Insight into the motives that led business people to organize their firms as private
limited liability companies can be gained by analyzing the provisions of the articles of
association they drafted. We begin with three French SARLs that registered with the
Paris Tribunal de Commerce on December 8 and 9, 1932. 74 These examples illustrate an
important aspect of the PLLC, namely its chameleon-like ability to replicate other
organizational forms and at the same time improve on them. In France the main source of
that flexibility was a clause in the SARL statute, taken from the jurisprudence of
commandites, whereby managers who were specifically named in the articles of
association could not be removed without serious cause. 75
Our first firm was an association of architects and real estate developers formed
for the purpose of jointly carrying out real estate projects. The articles appointed two of
the owners of les Constructeurs, as the firm was called, to be the initial managers, but
also stipulated that after six months the managers would have to stand for election at a
general shareholders’ meeting. From then on the managers would serve as long as they
had the support of the owners of a majority of the shares. Because the two initial
managers owned only 392 of 1,000 shares, the other associates could challenge their
power. This SARL was rather large. With eight owners and four times the minimum
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required capital, it would have been impractical to run it by unanimous consent. Hence its
owners set it up like a corporation, though without the burden of a board of directors or
an audit committee as would be required for an SA.
A second SARL, Coupax, was registered shortly after les Constructeurs ,.
Formed to manufacture and commercialize a machine for the butchers’ trade, it had three
owners, one of whom was named manager. Although the manager had only 18 of 40
shares, he was effectively a dictator. The other associates were de facto silent partners;
they contributed capital and some effort to the company, but they had no role in
management. Major changes to the articles required the assent of the owners of three
fourth of shares, so for all practical purposes the governing rules could not be altered
without the consent of the manager. This SARL essentially reproduced the structure of a
limited partnership with the advantage that the general partner’s liability was limited.
The next day two associates registered our third firm,“Stores et Enseignes,” which
installed awnings and signage for Parisian businesses. One of the associates owned three
fifths of the shares and hence, under the standard voting rules for SARLs, would have
had dictatorial powers. However, the associates avoided this outcome by naming both
owners managers in the contract. Because neither manager could legally be forced out
without cause, they had to run the firm by unanimous consent. This SARL was
effectively a partnership in which the consent of both partners was required to encumber
the firm, but it was a partnership in which all the members had limited liability, and it
was not subject to dissolution before the expiration of its term. Intriguingly, the articles
included an additional provision that came into effect if one of the owners surrendered his
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shares to a relative. Then the shareholders’ meetings would be run on a majority basis,
except for changes to the statutes which still required unanimity. 76
As these three examples show, by varying just one aspect of their articles of
association—the ability to name a manager or not—French business people could use the
SARL to improve upon alternative forms of organization, avoiding the regulatory burden
of the corporation, eliminating the unlimited liability that one or more of the associates
had to bear in partnerships, and reducing the problem of untimely dissolution in ordinary
partnerships. They could also do a lot more than that, but we move on to a German
example to highlight some of the additional ways in which the contractual flexibility of
the PLLC could be exploited. Of course, just avoiding the regulatory burden of the
corporation was even more valuable in Germany than in France.
The case involves a GmbH formed to take over and operate a manufacturer of
ornamental embroidery for furniture in Nowawes, now part of Potsdam. 77 Emmo
Pechatscheck, Jr. owned the original firm. Pechatscheck’s mother, Helene, and two
apparently unrelated investors, Berthold Thon and Walter Vockel, formed the GmbH to
buy him out. Thon put in three fifths of the enterprise’s 25,000 Marks of capital, while
Vockel and Helene Peschatscheck put in one fifth each. Emmo, Sr., who was not an
owner, was named manager. The default rules would have made Thon the firm’s
dictator, since he owned a majority of the shares. However, the articles of association
included a provision requiring the unanimous consent of the owners to fire the business
manager. Hence Emmo, Sr. could only be removed if his wife agreed. The associates
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also added provisions designed to protect the Pechatscheck family against the threat of
untimely dissolution. Should they wish to withdraw, Thon and Vockel were obliged first
to offer their shares to the father and son at a price determined by a mechanism included
in the contract. This provision reassured the Peschatscheck family that the outside
investors could not simply wind up the firm and walk away. Eliminating the capacity of
the outsiders to force a dissolution also increased the family’s bargaining power in the
operation of the firm. In exchange, the Peschatschecks offered Thon and Vockel a larger
share of the firm’s profits and, in effect, guaranteed their investments. §4 declared that
invested capital would earn a 5 percent return, a provision that was common in GmbH
contracts. §7 gave Thon and Frau Peschatscheck each two fifths of the profits of the firm
(over and above the 5 percent mentioned earlier). In addition, Helene Peschatscheck and
her husband (who was not an owner of the firm!) guaranteed that Thon and Vockel’s
investments would always be equal to what they put in, plus the accumulated 5 percent—
in effect allowing Helene Peschatscheck to withdraw earnings only when the firm was
profitable. 78
In this example (as in many others), associates adopted articles that made their
firm quite different from what it would have been had they followed the default
provisions in the GmbH law or organized as a partnership or a corporation. Although
such complicated rules for the distribution of profits might have been feasible in a
partnership or even in an AG, the restrictions on dissolution were not compatible with a
partnership. A limited partnership with Thon and Vockel as the limited partners could
have replicated the GmbH’s organization from their point of view, but it would have left
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the Peschatchecks with unlimited liability. Organizing an AG would have far more
complicated and costly, and additional outside investors would have been needed to make
up the minimum seven shareholders required by law. Moreover, it would not have been
easy to protect the manager of an AG against dismissal.
The Peschatschecks benefited as well from another feature of PLLCs—the ability
to restrict the transfer of their shares. A second example, this time from Britain,
underscores the importance of this characteristic for SMEs. In 1927 the Mitchell family
transferred its brick and tile manufacturing business to a new company, Thomas Mitchell
& Sons (Guildford) Ltd., a private limited liability company. 79 The new firm had a
capital of £22,000, divided into 22,000 shares of £1 each. Four members of the Mitchell
family each received a quarter of the shares. The company accepted the standard articles
of association listed in Table A of the Companies Act, but opted out of 45 clauses. Most
of the clauses it rejected dealt with formalities concerning directors’ and stockholders’
meetings, procedures for nominating directors, and the like. A notable addition to the
articles permitted the directors to refuse to transfer shares if the outgoing member failed
to demonstrate to their satisfaction that the transferee was a responsible person or if they
found the transfer not in the interest of the company. This provision enabled the Mitchells
to preserve family control of their company.
Another British example involving a metal producer, the N. C. Zinc Oxide
Company, shows how the decision to keep a company private gave owners a great deal of
freedom to solve their contracting problems. 80 N. C. Zinc Oxide did not adopt Table A at
all but created its own articles. It had two classes of shares. The 47,500 class A shares
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had a nominal value of £1 each. The 50,000 class B shares had a value of 1 shilling each.
Class A shares were entitled to a preferred dividend of 7 percent. When additional profits
were distributed, three quarters would go to class A shares and one quarter to class B
shares. Henry Edwin Coley, who listed his occupation as technical investigator, held all
of the B shares, in exchange for which he transferred to the company a license to
manufacture zinc according to a certain patent. Lloyds Bank held 61 percent of the A
shares, and the rest were held by 36 other shareholders, 25 of whom each had less than 1
percent of the shares. Each share had one vote, irrespective of its nominal value. As a
result Coley controlled the company. In addition, the articles made Coley a director for
life.
As this example illustrates, the contractual flexibility offered by the PLLC could
be used by an entrepreneur to raise substantial capital from outsiders without losing
control. It also enabled an outside financier to acquire securities that intermixed features
of both debt (through the fixed dividend of its preferred share) and equity (because the
same share claimed 75 percent of the residual return). N. C. Zinc Oxide’s articles also
created an incentive for the entrepreneur (Coley) to strive for a high level of profits
because his return only began after the firm had earned at least £3325 and because
beyond that level his profits could be handsome. The bank’s large stake gave it veto
power under the Company’s Act over certain decisions, notably the amendment of the
articles of association, and it seems the bank retained the capacity to sell out at a later
time subject to the approval of the directors. 81
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In the US entrepreneurs for the most part did not have the ability to improve upon
the standard partnership and corporate forms until well after World War II. Nevertheless,
articles drawn up by the partnership associations that formed after Pennsylvania passed
its enabling statute in 1874 suggest that Americans too would have exploited the PLLC’s
additional contractual flexibility. For instance, organizers of the Cecil Paper Co., Ltd.,
were much more worried about minority oppression than untimely dissolution. They set
an early dissolution date of slightly under three years from the date of their articles of
association to provide them with an opportunity to exit. At the same time, they built
additional safeguards into their agreement to keep controlling shareholders from
expropriating the minority’s profits. The stockholders were to meet twice a year to
balance the books of the association and appraise the value of the business and of each
member’s share. If there was a difference of opinion, the value would be set by a ballot
in which each member of the association would exercise one vote. In other matters, such
as the election of directors, stockholders’ votes were weighted by the value of their
interest. Minority investors in the Cecil Paper Company were happy to let the majority
run the firm, but they wanted to be sure that they got their fair share of the profits. 82
By contrast, minority investors in the Carnegie Steel Company, Ltd., were far
more worried about untimely dissolution than about minority oppression when they
organized their partnership association in 1892. A few years earlier Andrew Carnegie
had been so seriously ill that it appeared he would die, and his partners in the company’s
predecessor firms had faced the dire possibility that they would be bankrupted by the cost
of settling his estate. The solution they had devised was to add a clause to their
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partnership agreements giving the surviving associates the right to buy out Carnegie’s
interest at book value over an extended period of time (fifteen years). Any partner who
wished to leave the firm faced the same terms; he had to sell his shares to the company at
book value (payable in installments over a period that depended on the magnitude of the
interest). Of course, the minority investors could have protected themselves against
untimely dissolution by organizing the firm as a corporation, but Carnegie was not
willing to go along. He wanted to be able to control who could be a member of the
firm—to reward talented managers with ownership shares and to get rid of partners who
did not share his strategic vision. Hence he imposed the famous “Iron Clad” contract.
Upon the vote of three-quarters of the partners in number and value of shares, any
member of the firm could be forced to sell out his interest in the company at book value.
Carnegie then used his power in the firm to keep the company’s book value was far
below its market value, so the agreement had considerable bite. 83
The demise of the partnership association meant that Americans for the most part
lost this ability to trade off untimely dissolution against minority oppression and control
the identity of members of their enterprises until late in the twentieth century. Although
business people in the US could avoid the danger of untimely dissolution by organizing
corporations, in most states the relative inflexibility of the corporate form meant that they
could not do much to control the risk of minority oppression. 84 As late as 1945, for
example, the New York State Court of Appeals struck down a corporate bylaw requiring
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stockholders’ unanimous consent for the election of directors on the grounds that “the
state, granting to individuals the privilege of limiting their individual business debts by
forming themselves into an entity separate and distinct from the persons who own it,
demand in turn that the entity take a prescribed form and conduct itself, procedurally,
according to fixed rules.” 85 Over the next couple of decades, as we have seen, many
states would revise their general incorporation statutes to give business people greater
contractual flexibility. As one member of the commission that drafted the new statute in
Connecticut testified in a hearing held by the legislature’s General Law Committee, it
was just such rigidity that the proposed law aimed to overcome. After recounting a
similar case where the Connecticut courts overturned a set of corporate bylaws written to
prevent oppression, the commissioner praised the new statute for including “provisions
whereby the by-laws or the certificate of incorporation may provide … for greater than a
majority consent to any decision or the determination of any matters involved in the
corporate affairs.” The “most desirable thing” about the bill was “this flexibility,” which
“permits the little fellow to set up an organization and handle it in the way he intends
without in any way sacrificing the rights of creditors or sacrificing any right of these
particular individuals as between themselves.” 86

Conclusion
The history of the PLLC is not consistent with current trends in scholarship that
make invidious comparisons between common-law and code-law countries. Neither the
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timing of the enabling legislation for the PLLC nor the rate of the new form’s adoption fit
this kind of black and white division of the world. Germany, a code country, was the first
mover, but German firms were relatively slow to take advantage of the new form. When
the UK, a common-law country, followed in 1907, British business people rapidly
substituted the PLLC for the corporation, but partnerships remained a popular
organizational form. France, a code country, was third in 1925. There the PLLC almost
immediately became the form of choice, reducing the take-up of corporations and
virtually eliminating the use of general and limited partnerships. In the common-law US,
businesses did not obtain the equivalent of the PLLC form until the second half of the
twentieth century, but then, as in France, they seem to have adopted it to the virtual
exclusion of all non-joint-stock forms of organization.
Much of the variation across countries in the timing of the innovation owed to
events and path-dependent processes that were specific to each case. The German
reforms of 1884, themselves a reaction to abuses during the Gründerboom of 1871-73,
made the corporation so unattractive to all but the largest firms that it stimulated a
movement to provide SMEs with an alternative. In Britain liberal general incorporation
laws made the corporate form increasingly attractive to SMEs in the second half of the
nineteenth century. The restrictive 1900 Companies Act, a response to worries about
abuses by large public companies, made the corporation less suitable to businesses that
did not intend to sell their equities on the market and, as in Germany, led to enabling
legislation for the PLLC. In France the story was very different. The recovery of Alsace
and Lorraine from Germany brought into the country firms that were organized as
GmbHs and unwilling to give up the advantages of the form. In the US it is likely that
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relative tax rates encouraged SMEs to incorporate and also to push for changes that
would make the corporate form more suitable for their businesses.
In all of these cases the popularity of the PLLC casts doubt on the corporation’s
putative superiority. Even where the corporate form was most popular during the late
nineteenth century ( the UK and the US), it was adopted by far less than half of all multiowner enterprises. Many owners of SMEs worried about the threat of minority
oppression in the corporation to such an extent that they were willing to bear the
partnership’s substantial risk of untimely dissolution. Others saw untimely dissolution as
the more costly threat and so organized their firms as corporations. Regardless, they had
to choose the lesser of two evils. The PLLC got them off the horns of this dilemma by
enabling business people to secure some of the advantages of corporations without taking
on all of the form’s disadvantages.
Because firms that organized as PLLCs could not issue equity to the public, our
study has focused on the advantage of the form to SMEs. But we have come across
numerous instances of large firms that chose to organize as PLLCs or even as some form
of limited partnership. In still other cases large corporations modified their governance
structure to obtain contractual features (multiple class shares, for example, or special
advantages for large shareholders) that deviated in significant ways from the standard
form idealized in the literature. Although historically the corporation and large-scale
enterprises developed hand in hand, we caution against seeing the former as necessary for
the latter. If Andrew Carnegie did not need the corporation to build the largest and most
efficient steel company in the US, who did?
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Figure 1: Impact of PLLC laws when incorporation is cheap

Note: The numbers in this figure are purely heuristic.

Figure 2: Impact of PLLC laws when incorporation is expensive

Note: The numbers in this figure are purely heuristic.
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Figure 3: Distribution of new firms among multi-owner organizational forms, France, 1852-1978

Sources and Notes: Annuaire de la Justice. Figures for the years 1914-1918 were interpolated using totals for Paris collected at the
Archives de Paris.
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Figure 4. Distribution of new firms among multi-owner organizational forms: Prussia, 1867-1932

Sources and Notes: Data were compiled from the Königlich preussischer Staats-Anzeiger (until 1871) and the Deutscher
Reichsanzeiger und preussischer Staatsanzeiger (after 1871). We counted every new firm announced by a commercial registry in
January of each year reported. Note that the source pertains only to Prussia only
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Figure 5. Ratio of new private to all new limited companies in Britain, 1900-2000

Source: UK Board of Trade, General Annual Report under the Companies (Winding-up) Act of 1890 (London, 1900-1921); UK Board
of Trade, Report (London, 1922-2000).
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Figure 6: Share of all joint-stock companies that take the PLLC form

Sources: See Figures 3, 4, and 5.
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Figure 7: Share of all new multi-owner firms that adopt a PLLC form

Sources: See Figures 3and 4.
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Table 1. Distribution of partnerships and corporations in the US,
by industry, 1947 and 1997

Number of
Corporations

Corporations
as Percent of
Multi-Owner
Forms

Industry

Year

Number of
Partnerships

All

1947
1997

888,862
1,758,627

551,807
4,710,083

0.38
0.73

Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fishing

1947
1997

120,402
127,060

7,329
163,114

0.06
0.56

Mining

1947
1997

13,579
28,045

8,294
32,996

0.38
0.54

Construction

1947
1997

52,592
72,098

20,287
487,783

0.28
0.87

Manufacturing

1947
1997

74,978
40,022

112,184
325,045

0.60
0.89

Transportation, Communications, and Utilities

1947
1997

20,776
30,917

23,729
209,402

0.53
0.87

Wholesale and Retail Trade 1947
1997

372,212
173,009

177,297
1,149,132

0.32
0.87

Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate

1947
1997

87,647
974,223

151,043
744,545

0.63
0.43

Services

1947
1997

130,954
310,990

45,975
1,592,854

0.26
0.84

Other

1947
1997

15,722
2,263

5,669
5,201

0.27
0.70

Source: Susan Carter, et al., Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition
(New York, 2006), Vol. 3, Tables Ch1-192.

Table 2. Distribution of organizational forms in the US, 1949 to 2002
Year
1949
1963
1979
1993
2002

Partnerships
61
41
34
26
18

Corporations
39
59
66
73
70

LLCs
---1
12

Sources: Carter, et al., Historical Statistics of the United States, Vol. 3, Tables Ch 193204; SOI Bulletin, various issues.
Note: The figures for ordinary partnerships include limited partnerships. Their
proportion of multi-owner forms has grown in recent years from about 4 percent in 1993
to about 6 percent in 2002, so the table understates the drop in ordinary partnerships.
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Appendix table: summary of terminology and abbreviations
Short Name or
Abbreviation

Country

Form

Full name

AG

Germany

Corporation

Aktiengesellschaft

Commandite
simple

France

Limited partnership

Société en commandite
simple

Commandite
par action

France

Limited partnership
with tradable shares

Société en commandite
par action

GmbH

Germany

Private limited
company

Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung

KG

Germany

Limited partnership

Kommanditgesellschaft

KGaA

Germany

Limited partnership
with tradable shares

Kommanditgesellschaft
auf Aktien

OHG

Germany

Ordinary partnership

Offene
Handelsgesellschaft

PA

US (some
states)

Private limited
company

Partnership association

Private limited
company

Britain

Private limited
company

Private limited company

SA

France

Corporation

Société anonyme

SARL

France

Private limited
company

Société á responsibilité
limitée
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